Was die Palästinenserführer nicht wollen

Palestinian Leaders Don’t Want an Independent State

by Efraim Karsh
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2014


The Palestinian leadership’s serial rejection of the numerous opportunities for statehood since the Peel Commission report of 1937 casts a serious doubt on its interest in the creation of an independent state. Instead of engaging in the daunting tasks of nation-building and state creation, all Palestinian leaders without any exception—from the Jerusalem mufti Hajj Amin Husseini, who led the Palestinian Arabs from the early 1920s to the late 1940s; to Yasser Arafat, who dominated Palestinian politics from the mid-1960s to his death in November 2004; to Mahmoud Abbas—have preferred to immerse their hapless constituents in disastrous conflicts that culminated in their collective undoing and continued statelessness. At the same time, of course, these leaders have lined their pockets from the proceeds of this ongoing tragedy.

It can be shown that the main sources of this self-destructive conduct are pan-Arab delusions, Islamist ideals, and the vast financial and political gains attending the perpetuation of Palestinian misery.

Pan-Arab Delusions

Jerusalem mufti Hajj Amin Husseini (left), in one of his letters to Hitler (right), did not speak of Palestinian aspirations, but rather, pan-Arab goals: „[T]he Arab people … confidently expects that the result of your final victory will be their independence and complete liberation, as well as the creation of their unity, when they will be linked to your country by a treaty of friendship and cooperation.“In discussions of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is rarely acknowledged that, as products of the Ottoman imperial system where religion constituted the linchpin of the sociopolitical order of things,

Palestinian Arab leaders during the British mandate era (1920-48) had no real grasp of the phenomenon of nationalism, hence, had no interest in the evolution of a distinct Palestinian nation. Instead they were wedded to the pan-Arab dream of a unified „Arab nation“ (of which „Palestine“ was but a tiny fragment) or the associated ideology of Greater Syria (Suriya al-Kubra), stressing the territorial and historical indivisibility of most of the Fertile Crescent.

As early as October 1919, Musa Kazim Husseini, a former Ottoman official, elected Jerusalem mayor under the British, told a Zionist acquaintance that „we demand no separation from Syria.“[1]

Six months later, in April 1920, his peers instigated the first anti-Jewish pogrom in Jerusalem—not in the name of Palestine’s independence but under the demand for its incorporation into the (short-lived) Syrian kingdom headed by Faisal ibn Hussein of Mecca, the celebrated hero of the „Great Arab Revolt“ against the Ottoman Empire and the effective leader of the nascent pan-Arab movement. Four years later, in a special report to the League of Nations, the Arab Executive Committee (AEC), the umbrella organization of the Palestinian Arabs, still referred to Palestine as the unlawfully severed southern part of „the one country of Syria, with its one population of the same language, origin, customs, and religious beliefs, and its natural boundaries.“[2] And in June 1926, the league’s permanent mandates commission was informed of an Arab complaint that „it was not in conformity with Article 22 of the Mandate to print the initials and even the words ‚Eretz Israel‘ after the name ‚Palestine‘ while refusing the Arabs the title ‚Surial Janonbiah‘ [‚Southern Syria‘].“[3]

In July 1937, the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), the AEC’s successor, justified its rejection of the Peel Commission’s recommendation for the partition of Palestine on the grounds that „this country does not belong only to [the] Palestine Arabs but to the whole Arab and Muslim Worlds.“[4] As late as August 1947, three months before the passing of the U.N. resolution partitioning Mandate Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, the AHC’s mouthpiece al-Wahda advocated the incorporation of Palestine (and Transjordan) into „Greater Syria.“[5]

Hajj Amin Husseini himself never acted as a local patriot seeking national self-determination but rather as an aspiring pan-Arab regional advocate. An early admirer of the „Greater Syrian“ ideal, he co-edited the Jerusalem-based newspaper Suria al-Janubiyya and presided over the city’sArab Club, which advocated Palestine’s annexation to Syria. He cast his sights much higher after fleeing the country in 1937 to avoid arrest by the British for the instigation of nationwide violence: Presenting himself to Hitler and Mussolini as a spokesman for the entire „Arab nation,“ Husseini argued that the Palestine problem necessitated an immediate solution not because of the national aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs but because it constituted „an obstacle to the unity and independence of the Arab countries by pitting them directly against the Jews of the entire world, dangerous enemies, whose secret arms are money, corruption, and intrigue.“ His proposed solution, therefore, was not Palestinian statehood but „the independence of [unified] Palestine, Syria, and Iraq“ under his leadership. As he put it in one of his letters to Hitler, „[T]he Arab people, slandered, maltreated, and deceived by our common enemies, confidently expects that the result of your final victory will be their independence and complete liberation, as well as the creation of their unity, when they will be linked  to your country by a treaty of friendship and cooperation.“[6]

While the young generation of diaspora Palestinian activists who began organizing in the 1950s witha view to avenging the 1948 „catastrophe“of the creation of Israel did not share the mufti’s grandiose ambitions, they were no less committed to the pan-Arab ideal as evidenced by the name of the first „resistance“ Group—the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). The pan-Arab ideal was also evident in the diverse composition of the movement comprising Palestinian (e.g., George Habash, Wadi Haddad) and Arab activists (notably Hani Hindi, scion of a respected Damascene family).[7]

Ahmad Shuqeiri, a Lebanon-born politician of mixed Egyptian, Hijazi, and Turkish descent, became the founding chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. But in May 1956, he told the U.N. Security Council, „Palestine is part and parcel in the Arab homeland,“ adding that Palestine „is nothing but southern Syria.“Another prominent adherent to the pan-Arab ideal was Ahmad Shuqeiri, a Lebanon-born politician of mixed Egyptian, Hijazi, and Turkish descent, who served as the Arab League’s deputy secretary-general and as the Syrian and Saudi delegate to the U.N. before becoming, on May 28, 1964, the founding chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), established that day by the Arab states at the initiative of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser.

„Palestine is part and parcel in the Arab home-land,“ Shuqeiri told the U.N. Security Council on May 31, 1956: „The Arab world is not prepared to surrender one single atom of their right to this sacred territory.“ Clarifying to which part of the „Arab homeland“ this specific territory belonged, he added that Palestine „is nothing but southern Syria.“ In his account, „the Palestine area was linked to Syria from time immemorial“ and „there was no question of separation“ until the great powers brought this about by creating mandates under the League of Nations, with Britain controlling Palestine and France administering Syria.[8]

Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the PLO’s hallowed founding document, the Palestinian Charter, adopted upon its formation and revised four years later to reflect the organization’s growing militancy, has little to say about the Palestinians themselves. Devoting about two-thirds of its thirty-three articles to the need to destroy Israel, it defines the Palestinians as „an integral part of the Arab nation“ rather than a distinct nationality and vows allegiance to the ideal of pan-Arab unity—that is to Palestine’s eventual assimilation into „the greater Arab homeland“—while seeking to harness this ideal to its short-term Ends:

  • The destiny of the Arab Nation and, indeed, Arab existence itself depend upon the destiny of the Palestinian cause. From this inter-dependence springs the Arab nation’s pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. … Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work toward the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work toward the realization of the other.[9]

Jewish rabbis purchasing land from an Arab landowner (left), 1920s. In Mandate Palestine, ordinary Arabs were persecuted and murdered by their alleged betters for the crime of „selling Palestine“ to the Jews. Meanwhile, these same betters were enriching themselves with impunity. Many prominent leaders made a handsome profit by selling land to Jews.Even the November 1988 „declaration of independence“ by the Palestine National Council, the PLO’s „parliament,“ while obviously endorsing the idea of Palestinian statehood (in language that massively plagiarized Israel’s proclamation of independence),[10] vows allegiance to the pan-Arab ideal by describing the „State of Palestine“ as „an integral part of the Arab nation, of its heritage and civilization and of its present endeavor for the achievement of the goals of liberation, development, democracy and unity.“[11]

As late as 2002, eight years after the establishment of a PLO-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to lay the groundwork for Palestinian statehood in these territories, the prominent Israeli Arab politician Azmi Bishara, founding leader of the nationalist Balad Party (with seats in the Israeli parliament since 1999), asserted that „my Palestinian identity never precedes my Arab identity.… I don’t think there is a Palestinian nation, there is [only] an Arab nation.… Palestine until the end of the nineteenth century was the southern part of Greater Syria,“ and the idea of a distinct Palestinian nation is a „colonialist invention“ that happens to coincide with the consistent Israeli attempt, by both left- and rightwing parties, to ignore the reality of pan-Arab nationalism.[12]

While such plain speaking is hardly commonplace in PLO/PA current rhetoric, these words help explain the group’s continued subscription to the pan-Arab ideal as evidenced by its deliberate failure to revise the Palestinian Charter so as to acknowledge the distinctness of Palestinian nationalism; the frequent articulation of pan-Arab themes by its tightly controlled media; its constitutional definition of the prospective state of Palestine as „part of the Arab homeland“ committed to the „goal of Arab unity“;[13] and the steady reiteration of the claim that the Palestinians are not fighting for their own corner but are rather the Arab nation’s „front line of defense.“[14] No less important, the PLO continues to subordinate its policies, and by extension Palestinian self-interest, to pan-Arab approval—and veto—as illustrated most recently by Abbas’s successful rallying of the Arab League behind his „absolute and decisive rejection to recognizing Israel as a Jewish state.“[15]

Upholding this position—sixty-six years after the creation of a Jewish state by an internationally recognized act of self-determination—effectively amounts to the rejection of Palestinian statehood for the simple reason that Israel would not self-destruct while the Palestinians and the Arab states are in no position to bring this about.

Islamist Imperial Dreams

If subscription to the pan-Arab dream has made the Palestinian cause captive to inter-Arab machinations, stirring unrealistic hopes and expectations in Palestinian political circles and, at key junctures, inciting widespread and horrifically destructive violence that has made the likelihood of Palestinian statehood ever more remote, adherence to Islamist ideals has subordinated Palestinian identity to the far wider ambition of Islamic world domination.

Consider the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its Arabic acronym Hamas. Since making its debut in the 1987-92 intifada, Hamas has established itself as the foremost political and military Palestinian force, winning a landslide victory in the 2006 general elections and evicting the PLO from Gaza the following year. Far from being an ordinary liberation movement in search of national self-determination, Hamas has subordinated its aim of bringing about the destruction of Israel and the creation of a Palestinian state on its ruins to the wider goal of establishing Allah’s universal empire. In doing so, it has followed in the footsteps of its Egyptian parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, which viewed its violent opposition to Zionism from the 1930s and 1940s as an integral part of the Manichean struggle for the creation of a worldwide caliphate rather than as a defense of the Palestinian Arabs‘ national rights. In the words of the senior Hamas leader Mahmud Zahar, „Islamic and traditional views reject the notion of establishing an independent Palestinian state … In the past, there was no independent Palestinian state. … [Hence] our main goal is to establish a great Islamic state, be it pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic.“[16] He further explained: „Our position stems from our religious convictions … This is a holy land. It is not the property of the Palestinians or the Arabs. This land is the property of all Muslims in all parts of the world.“[17]

Echoing standard Muslim Brotherhood precepts, Hamas’s covenant adopted in 1988 presents the organization as designed not merely to „liberate Palestine from Zionist occupation“ but to pursue the far loftier goals of spreading Islam’s holy message and defending the weak and oppressed throughout the world: „As the Islamic Resistance Movement paves its way, it will back the oppressed and support the wronged [throughout the world] in all its might. It will spare no effort to bring about justice and defeat injustice, in word and deed, in this place and everywhere it can reach and have influence therein.“[18] As the movement’s slogan puts it: „Allah is [Hamas’s] target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path, and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.“[19]

Palestinian Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar walks on an Israeli flag during a rally to mark the anniversary of the group’s founding, Gaza City, December 9, 2010. Despite its anti-Israel rhetoric, Hamas has subordinated its aim of destroying the Jewish state and creating a Palestinian state to the wider goal of establishing a universal Islamic empire. Zahar explained: „Islamic and traditional views reject the notion of establishing an independent Palestinian state … [Hence] our main goal is to establish a great Islamic state.“In other words, the „question of Palestine“ is neither an ordinary territorial dispute between two national movements nor a struggle by an indigenous population against a foreign occupier. It is an integral part of Islam’s millenarian jihad to expand its domain and prevent the fall of any of its parts to the infidels: „[T]he land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [Islamic religious endowment] consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day. …The day that enemies usurp part of Moslem land, Jihad becomes the individual duty of every Moslem.“[20]

In this respect, there is no difference between Palestine and other parts of the world conquered by the forces of Islam throughout history. To this very day, for example, Arabs and many Muslims unabashedly pine for the restoration of Muslim Spain and look upon their expulsion from that country in 1492 as a grave historical injustice. Indeed, even countries that have never been under Islamic imperial rule have become legitimate targets of Islamist fervor. Since the late 1980s, various Islamist movements have looked upon the growing number of French Muslims as a sign that France, too, has become a potential part of the House of Islam. Their British counterparts have followed suit. „We will remodel this country in an Islamic image,“ the London-based preacher Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad told an attentive audience less than two months after 9/11. „We will replace the Bible with the Qur’an.“[21]Khaled Mash’al, head of Hamas’s political bureau and the organization’s effective leader, echoed this sentiment as a tidal wave of Muslim violence swept across the world in response to satirical depictions of the prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper in February 2006:

  • By Allah, you will be defeated … Hurry up and apologize to our nation, because if you do not, you will regret it. This is because our nation is progressing and is victorious … Tomorrow, our nation will sit on the throne of the world. This is not a figment of the imagination but a fact. Tomorrow we will lead the world, Allah willing. Apologize today, before remorse will do you no good.[22]

Nor is this supremacist worldview limited to Hamas. Since its rise in the early seventh century, Islam has constituted the linchpin of Middle Eastern politics, and its hold on Palestinian society is far stronger than is commonly recognized. Contrary to the received wisdom in the West, the PLO is hardly a secular organization. Arafat was a devout Muslim, associated in his early days with the Muslim Brotherhood, as were other founding fathers of Fatah, the PLO’s foremost constituent organization. And while the new generation of Fatah leaders in the territories may be less religious, they, nevertheless, have a draft constitution for a prospective Palestinian state stipulating that „Islam is the official religion in Palestine“ and Shari’a is „a main source for legislation.“[23]

They have, moreover, utilized the immense inflammatory potential of Islam to discredit the two-state solution—and by implication, the prospect of Palestinian statehood—and to express their grandiose supremacist delusions. In the words of the official PA television, „Where did Great Britain disappear? By Allah’s will, He will get rid of the US like he got rid of them. We [Muslims] have ruled the world; a day will come by Allah, and we shall rule the world [again]. The day will come, and we shall rule America; the day will come, and we shall rule Britain. We shall rule the entire world.“[24]

Within these grand overlapping schemes of pan-Arab regional unity and Islamic world domination, the notion of Palestinian statehood is but a single transient element whose supposed centrality looms far greater in Western than in Islamic and Arab eyes.

Profits of Misery

But whatever their ideological and political convictions, Palestinian leaders have never had a real stake in statehood both because the hopes and wishes of their constituents did not figure in their calculations and because they have vastly profited from having their hapless constituents run around in circles for nearly a century while milking world sympathy for the plight they have brought about in the first place.

In Mandate Palestine, ordinary Arabs were persecuted and murdered by their alleged betters for the crime of „selling Palestine“ to the Jews. Meanwhile, these same betters were enriching themselves with impunity. The staunch pan-Arabist Awni Abdel Hadi, who vowed to fight „until Palestine is either placed under a free Arab government or becomes a graveyard for all the Jews in the country,“[25] 


1] Daniel Pipes, „Palestine for the Syrians?Commentary, Dec. 1986.

[2] Jamal Husseini, „Report of the State of Palestine during the Four Years of Civil Administration, Submitted to the Mandate’s Commission of the League of Nations through H.E. the High Commissioner for Palestine, by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress—Extract,“ Oct. 6, 1924, Central Zionist Archive (CZA, Jerusalem), S25/10690, p. 1.

[3]Minutes of the Ninth Session, Held at Geneva from June 8th to 25th, 1926, including the Report of the Commission to the Council,“ 22nd meeting, Permanent Mandates Commission, League of Nations, June 22, 1926.

[4] „The Arabs Reject Partition,“ quoted from Palestine & Transjordan, July 17, 1937, p. 1, CZA; „Minutes of the JAE Meeting on Apr. 19, 1937,“ Ben-Gurion Archive (Sde Boker).

[5]The New York Times, Aug. 25, 1947.

[6] The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry (Enclosure), July 6, 1940, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (London: HMSO, 1949), ser. D, vol. 10, pp. 143-4; The Grand Mufti to Adolf Hitler, Jan. 20, 1941, ibid., ser. D, vol. 11, pp. 1151-5; Record of the Conversation between the Führer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on Nov. 28, 1941, in the Presence of Reich Foreign Minister and Minister Grobba in Berlin, Nov. 30, 1941, ibid., pp. 881-5.

[7] Ghada Hashem Talhami, Syria and the Palestinians: The Clash of Nationalisms (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), pp. 49-50.

[8] „Excerpts from Statements in the U.N. on Mideast,“ The New York Times, June 1, 1956; „Syria Says in U.N. Palestine Is Hers,“ ibid.

[9]The Palestinian National Charter, Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, July 1-17, 1968, art. 13-14; see, also, art. 11, 12, 15.

[10] Daniel Pipes, „Declaring Independence: Israel and the PLO,Orbis, Mar. 1989, pp. 247-60.

[11]Declaration of Independence (1988),“ website of the „State of Palestine.“

[12] Ari Shavit, „Ha’ezrah Azmi,Haaretz (Tel Aviv), Nov. 25, 2002; Bishara on Israeli Channel 2 TV, n.d., YouTube.

[13]2003 Permanent Constitution Draft, Palestinian Basic Law, chap. 1, art. 2, May 4, 2003.

[14] See, for example, statements by Fatah’s official spokesman Ahmad Assaf on official PA TV and Egyptian TV, Mar. 19, 2014, „Fatah Spokesman: Israel’s goal is to rule ‚from the Euphrates to the Nile,‘“ Palestinian Media Watch (Jerusalem), Mar. 23, 2014.

[15]Haaretz, Mar. 26, 2014.

[16] „Exclusive Interview with Hamas Leader,“ The Media Line, Sept. 22, 2005; Walid Mahmoud Abdelnasser, The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations, 1967-81 (London: Kegan Paul, 1994), p. 39.

[17] Zahar’s interview with Asharq al-Awsat (London), Aug. 18, 2005, in Special Dispatch, no. 964, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 19, 2005.

[18]Hamas Covenant,“ Yale Law School, Avalon Project, art. 10.

[19] Ibid., art. 8.

[20] Ibid., art. 11, 15.

[21] Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 306; Michel Gurfinkiel, „Islam in France: The-French Way of Life Is in Danger,“ Middle East Quarterly, Mar. 1997; The Observer (London), Nov. 4, 2001; Anthony Browne, „The Triumph of the East,“ The Spectator (London), July 24, 2004.

[22] Mash’al’s address, al-Murabit Mosque, Damascus, aired on Aljazeera TV (Doha), Feb. 3, 2006, in „Special Dispatch No. 1087,“ MEMRI, Feb. 7, 2006.

[23]2003 Permanent Constitution Draft, chap. 1, art. 5, 7.

[24]Palestinian Authority TV, May 13, 2005, Palestinian Media Watch.

[25] „Conversation with Awni Abdel Hadi,“ June 3, 1920, Hagana Archive (Tel Aviv), 80/145/11.

[26] David Ben-Gurion, My Talks with Arab Leaders (Jerusalem: Keter, 1972), pp. 15-6.

[27] Kenneth W. Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), pp. 182, 228-39.

[28] Gad Frumkin, Derekh Shofet Beyerushalaim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1956), pp. 216, 280-90; Eliahu Elath, Shivat Zion Vearav (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1974), p. 245; Yehuda Taggar, The Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestine: Arab Politics, 1930-1937 (New York and London: Garland, 1986), p. 83.

[29] Dov Joseph, The Faithful City: The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 194.

[30] Ion Pacepa, Red Horizons. Inside the Romanian Secret Service—The Memoirs of Ceausescu’s Spy Chief (London: Coronet Books, 1989), p. 28.

[31] Agence France-Presse, May 24, July 30, 1997; Khaled Abu Toameh, „Money down the Drain?“ Jerusalem Report, Jan. 8, 1998, p. 26; Ronen Bergman, Veharashut Netuna (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2002), p. 156.

[32] Ehud Ya’ari, „The Independent State of Arafat,“ Jerusalem Report, Sept. 5, 1996, pp. 22-3; Bergman, Veharashut Netuna, pp. 113-41; Rachel Ehrenfeld, „Where Does the Money Go? A Study of the Palestinian Authority,“ American Center for Democracy, New York, Oct.1, 2002, pp. 7-10; Said Aburish, Arafat: From Defender to Dictator (London: Bloomsbury, 1998), p. 306.

[33]Ynet (Tel Aviv), Aug. 16, 2006; Sydney (Aus.) Morning Herald, Feb. 13, 2004.

[34] Jonathan Schanzer, „Chronic Kleptocracy: Corruption within the Palestinian Political Establishment,“ Hearing before U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2012, pp. 17-8; Bergman, Veharashut Netuna, pp. 162-3; Ehrenfeld, „Where Does the Money Go?“ pp. 9-10; Yediot Ahronot (Tel Aviv), July 14, 2002.

[35]The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 29, 2010.


Die Bruderschaft der Vergewaltigerbestien

Rape in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood ‚Gets Even‘

by Raymond Ibrahim
Human Events
June 18, 2014


Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers recently went on a sexual assault and rape spree in Egypt as a way of „getting even“ with those women who dared to celebrate the presidential victory of Abdel Fatteh al-Sisi—the former army chief who overthrew Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt.

On June 8, when tens of thousands of Egyptians congregated in Tahrir Square to celebrate Sisi’s inauguration, dozens of women were sexually assaulted and many more harassed. According to a statement later released by the Ministry of Interior, seven men between the ages of 15 and 49 were arrested for sexually assaulting „a number of women.“

One 19-year-old female student was especially brutalized—and videotaped as she was stripped naked and sexually assaulted by a throng of men. (I saw the graphic video on YouTube, though it has since been removed; a much less graphic clip of the initial assault appears here.) A gun-waving police officer eventually managed to rescue the woman from her ordeal, though after sustaining injuries himself.

Sexually harassing or raping those supportive of Sisi by way of „retribution“ is not uncommon in Egypt. Earlier, a six-year-old boy was raped by a Muslim Brotherhood member who was „angered“ at the child for singing praises to Sisi. He lured the boy into a shed, locked the doors, and proceeded to rape him, while saying, „You’re always holding pictures of this Sisi and singing his praises. Come, I’ll humiliate and break you—and your Sisi.“

Although Western media never specify who is behind these sexual assaults—often citing „the mob“—Hala Sarhan, a popular TV host in Egypt alluded to the ultimate source that legitimizes sexual harassment and rape in Egypt, namely, Islamist preachers and leaders:

What was said to these people [rapists] to brainwash them into think that such violations on the person and body of this young girl [the aforementioned rape victim] were permissible? … I’ll tell you. The one in parliament who said this, is the same as the man who did that… And the one who told that girl that she is an infidel, is the same as the one in parliament who said that it’s permissible to marry a 9-year-old girl [based on the prophet of Islam’s example when he married the girl-child Aisha]. The ones who in the mosques told him that they [women] are in the pits of hell and the lures of Satan—adulteresses, that Satan lives in their bodies… This is what they tell them in the mosques! And they’re so upset now [Islamist preachers] because they can no longer continue to preach like this in the mosques! We thank you minister of religious endowments for stopping this mockery! [The new Egyptian government has cracked down on radical preachers.] Before [under Morsi], every guy that yelled and stomped got himself a pulpit to preach such thoughts into the minds of the youth—and then they went out thinking they are doing jihad. You see, they have this thing in their mind that says „If we curse or attack an infidel, that is jihad“…. Concerning the previous cases of sexual harassment, they [Islamist authorities] told people, „Why did she [any violated woman] leave her house in the first place? She deserves what she got!“ They told them, „Your sister needs to be circumcised“; told them, „In the house, beat her and discipline her, break her bones; and if she refuses to have sex with you, saying she’s tired or sick, curse her with the angels till the sun rises.“ We allowed these people to fill their minds with such ideas!

Such honesty is reminiscent of an Egyptian op-ed that appeared after a young Coptic woman was murdered by a pro-Brotherhood mob because they identified her as a Christian:

Those who killed the young and vulnerable Mary Sameh George, for hanging a cross in her car, are not criminals, but rather wretches who follow those who legalized for them murder, lynching, dismemberment, and the stripping bare of young Christian girls—without every saying „kill.“ [Islamic cleric] Yassir Burhami and his colleagues who announce their hate for Christians throughout satellite channels and in mosques—claiming that hatred of Christians is synonymous with love for Allah—they are the true killers who need to be tried and prosecuted.

At any rate, using sexual harassment and rape to force people to comply with Islamist agendas has a long history, especially in Egypt. In 2011, during the „Arab Spring,“ when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists were released from prison, legitimized and eventually rose to power, sexual harassment skyrocketed, as one graph showed. Moreover, UN research done in 2013, when Morsi was president, suggested that 99.3% of Egyptian women had experienced sexual harassment.

Indeed, in February, 2013, hundreds of Egyptian women took to the streets of Tahrir Square to protest this nonstop harassment. They held slogans like „Silence is unacceptable, my anger will be heard,“ and „A safe square for all; Down with sexual harassment.“ „Marchers also shouted chants against President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood group from which he hails,“ wrote Al Ahram Online.

The response was more sexual harassment and rapes. One woman was gang-raped for approximately 20 minutes and nearly died. And as Hala Sarhan pointed out, elements from the then Islamist-heavy government under Morsi blamed the women themselves, saying that:

women taking part in protests bear the responsibility of being sexually harassed, [and] describing what happens in some demonstrators‘ tents as „prostitution.“ Major General Adel Afify, member of the committee representing the Salafi Asala Party, criticized female protesters, saying that they „know they are among thugs. They should protect themselves before requesting that the Interior Ministry does so. By getting herself involved in such circumstances, the woman has 100 percent responsibility.“

Likewise, popular Salafi preacher Abu Islam sarcastically blamed the victims:

„They tell you women are a red line. They tell you that naked women [i.e., not wearing veils or hijabs]—who are going to Tahrir Square because they want to be raped—are a red line! And they ask Morsi and the Brotherhood to leave power!“ Abu Islam added that these women activists are going to Tahrir Square not to protest but to be sexually abused because they had wanted to be raped. „They have no shame, no fear and not even feminism. Practice your feminism, sheikha! It is a legitimate right for you to be a woman,“ he said. „And by the way, 90 percent of them are crusaders [i.e. Christian Copts] and the remaining 10 percent are widows who have no one to control them. You see women talking like monsters,“ he added.

The only silver lining in this cloud of Islamist rape that hovers over Egypt is that the differences between Morsi and his Brotherhood government, and Sisi and the post-Brotherhood government, are already apparent. In response to the endemic sexual harassment in Egypt, the new government

passed a law criminalizing all forms of sexual harassment… A new article, which has been issued into power, adds a harsh punishment to those found guilty of unwanted sexual contact…. Other amended laws, under article 306, declare that those found guilty of verbal sexual harassment in a private or public place will be sentenced to a minimum of six months in prison and fined no less than EGP 3,000 ( 420).

When I recently asked some analyst colleagues in Egypt if Morsi ever took any such measures against sexual harassment, the quip I received most was along the lines of „Take measures? He was the one ordering sexual harassment against his female critics.“

Still, and in keeping with Western MSM journalism, Sisi, who at least appears to be trying to take some measures against sexual harassment, is now being portrayed by the Guardian in a cynical light—while Morsi who did nothing and whose Islamist allies were responsible for inciting violence against women got a free pass—just like the New York Times recently tried to blame Sisi for the plight of Egypt’s religious minorities, without mentioning that it was often Morsi and the Islamists who put them there in the first place.

Raymond Ibrahim, author of Crucified Again: Exposing Islam’s New War on Christians (Regnery, April, 2013) is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Sudan Mother’s Case

‚Tip of the Iceberg‘ on Islamic Persecution

June 6, 2014


Evidence has again emerged indicating that if Western mainstream media actually reported more on the sufferings of Christians throughout the Islamic world, their lot would likely improve.

Meriam Ibrahim, a woman who is imprisoned in Sudan and sentenced to death on the charge that she apostatized from Islam and converted to Christianity—and who recently gave birth to a baby girl in prison—was reportedly going to „be freed in a few days,“ according to a BBC report:

Abdullahi Alzareg, an under-secretary at the foreign ministry, said Sudan guaranteed religious freedom and was committed to protecting the woman.
Khartoum has been facing international condemnation over the death sentence.
In an interview with The Times newspaper, British Prime Minister David Cameron described the ruling as „barbaric“ and out of step with today’s world (emphasis added).

Of course, soon after the BBC reported that Ibrahim would be freed, other reports appeared indicating that that is only a rumor—one that the BBC, which regularly tries to minimize the specter of Muslim persecution of Christians, jumped on—that Sudan was merely trying to save face before the international community.

According to the imprisoned Christian woman’s husband: „No Sudanese or foreign mediator contacted me. Maybe there are contacts between the Sudanese government and foreign sides that I’m not aware of.“

At any rate, why did Sudan say Ibrahim was going to be released? After all and despite what Sudan’s under-secretary says—that „Sudan guaranteed religious freedom and was committed to protecting the woman“—Khartoum’s Islamist government upholds Islam’s apostasy law, which actually guarantees that born Muslims do not have „religious freedom.“

As just one example, back in June 2012 in Sudan, a Muslim woman divorced her husband after he converted to Christianity. The court automatically granted her custody of their two sons (according to Islamic law, children of divorced parents are to remain with the father, but if the latter is an apostate, they go to the mother). When the father tried to visit his children, his ex-wife threatened to notify authorities. „They might take the case to a prosecution court, which might lead to my sentencing to death according to Islamic apostasy law—but I am ready for this,“ the Christian man had said. „I want the world to know this. What crime have I done?

And that’s the whole difference: „the world“ did not „know this,“ whereas the major media did report on Ibrahim’s plight, thereby exposing Sudan to international condemnation.

Precedents of this phenomenon—international outrage prompting Islamist governments to rethink their abuse of Christians—have occurred in other Muslim countries.

For example, back in September 2012, two other Christians under arrest and awaiting execution in the Islamic world—one, like Sudan’s Ibrahim, charged with apostasy in Iran, the other with blasphemy in Pakistan—were also released, but only after much widespread international condemnation, that is, only after the mainstream media exposed their plight.

As CNN had reported:

A Christian pastor sentenced to death in Iran for apostasy was reunited with his family Saturday after a trial court acquitted him… Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani, born to Muslim parents and a convert to Christianity by age 19, was released after being held in prison for almost three years under a death sentence…. His case drew international attention after his October 2009 arrest, and the 34-year-old pastor refused to recant his Christian beliefs (emphasis added).

Right around the same time, Pakistani authorities released a teenage Christian girl accused of blasphemy and facing the death penalty. Up till then, local Muslims had insisted that 14-year-old Rimsha Masih be put to death, warning that, if released, they would „take the law into their own hands.“ Her case also reached the international community, sparking widespread outrage and condemnation of Pakistan.

Earlier, in 2006, one Abdul Rahman was exposed as an apostate to Christianity and subsequently arrested, incarcerated, and sentenced to death. Because his story also received widespread media attention and international condemnation—and even a phone call from the U.S. Secretary of State Rice to Afghanistan’s president—Abdul Rahman was released under the pretext that he was mentally retarded, though most sources indicated he was quite sane. (Muslim governments regularly portray apostates and blasphemers whom they wish to release as retarded, since, according to Islamic law, the insane are not responsible for their actions. Even Pakistan’s Rimsha Masih, prior to her release, was portrayed as mentally retarded.)

The point here is that such prisoners of conscience are not released because their respective governments suddenly decided to act according to universal standards of human rights. If so, they would not have arrested the accused in the first place. Nor should such releases suggest that Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, or Sudan are rethinking Islam’s apostasy and blasphemy laws, which prescribe the death penalty.

After all, there are countless more Christian „blasphemers“ and „apostates“ rotting on death row in all three countries, not to mention all around the Islamic world.

As with Sudan, Christians in the aforementioned countries are habitually persecuted, imprisoned, and or killed. In Crucified Again: Exposing Islam’s New War on Christians, Iran’s persecution of apostates to Christianity is so widespread that it warrants a special „spotlight“ section; Pakistan also gets a special spotlight section for its frequent arrests and imprisonments of Christian „blasphemers.“

Indeed, just days ago a Christian couple in Pakistan, one illiterate the other disabled, received the death sentence for allegedly sending „blasphemous“ text messages.

However, unlike Sudan’s Ibrahim, Iran’s Nadarkhani, Pakistan’s Masih, and Afghanistan’s Rahman, the Western mainstream rarely if ever hears about these many unfortunates.

And that’s the whole difference.

Unlike the many faceless Christians persecuted all around the Islamic world, the Western mainstream media actually reported on these three, prompting public outrage, international condemnations, and in some instances the threat of diplomatic actions and/or sanctions.

For Sudan, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan such „infidels“ were simply too much of a liability to punish as Sharia demands—the same Sharia, incidentally, that teaches Muslims to be lax and tolerant when in their interest, such as when the international community puts them in the spotlight.

Thus such freed Christians are a reminder of the important role the Western mainstream media can play in alleviating the sufferings of minorities throughout the Islamic world. For if they were not reported on—as the overwhelming majority of persecuted Christians are not reported on—they would surely still be in prison on death row, where so many other nameless and faceless Christians remain.

So consider the impact the mainstream media could have if they were to report the full truth and extent of Muslim persecution of Christians; if they stopped portraying the few they do report on as anomalies but rather as the tips of a very big and ugly iceberg.

The fact remains: the overwhelming majority of people in the West remain woefully ignorant of the sufferings of non-Muslims under Islam, thanks to the mainstream media’s general indifference or worse.

However, as precedent suggests, when enough people in the West do hear about them, they do act, prompting their governments and human rights groups also to act, prompting Islamist governments to realize that persecuting this or that Christian is simply not worth it.

In the case of Sudan’s Meriam Ibrahim, time will only tell if the major media will forget about or try to dismiss her story—as the BBC may be doing—or whether they will continue exposing the truth of her plight, which, at this point, is likely the only way this wife and mother who refuses to renounce Christianity for Islam can ever hope to escape execution.

Raymond Ibrahim, a CBN News contributor, is author of Crucified Again: Exposing Islam’s New War on Christians and The Al Qaeda Reader. He is also Shillman Fellow, David Horowitz Freedom Center; Judith Friedman Rosen Writing Fellow, Middle East Forum; and Media Fellow 2013, Hoover Institution.


Ein neuer Scharia-Staat

An ‚Islamic State‘ Is Born

by Jonathan Spyer
The Jerusalem Post
June 12, 2014

In a stunning and deeply significant development, the fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) organization this week captured the city of Mosul. They then moved on to take Tikrit unopposed and according to reports yesterday were headed toward the capital, Baghdad.

Five-hundred thousand people have fled Mosul in the wake of its conquest by the jihadis. The city, which has an Arab majority population along with large Kurdish and Turkmen minorities, is Iraq’s second largest. Its capture was the latest and most significant success in an offensive launched by the ISIS jihadis a week ago.

It also represents a calamitous defeat for the US-trained security forces of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

ISIS is the most brutal and best-organized of the jihadi elements that have emerged in Iraq and Syria over the last decade. It now controls a contiguous area of territory stretching from deep into western Iraq and including the cities of Mosul and Falluja, across the border into Syria, taking in the province of Raqqa, including its capital Raqqa City, and continuing until the border with Turkey. The movement has a presence as far as the southern suburbs of Baghdad.

The ISIS offensive into Iraq was well-planned, and its execution shows the extent to which ISIS sees its activities in Iraq and Syria as part of a single conflict.

Volltext: http://www.meforum.org/4724/an-islamic-state-is-born



Brief an den Bundespräsidenten

Bundespräsident. Miteinander der Verschiedenen


9. Juni 2014

Gauck trifft Opfer des NSU-Anschlags


Miteinander der Verschiedenen


Gudrun Eussner:

Sehr geehrter Herr Bundespräsident,

es wird Zeit, daß Sie, der Sie so begeistert vom Islam sind, Ihre Ihnen angetraute Ehefrau Hansi ins öffentliche Leben einführen und so mit zwei Frauen auftreten. Vielleicht können Sie in einem islamischen Land Ihre Zweitfrau heiraten, das machen in Deutschland schon einige Muslime aus islamischen Ländern. Diese sind dann in Deutschland legal nur einmal verheiratet, aber ihre Zweitfrau und folgende beziehen dann Sozialhilfe und Kindergeld als alleinerziehende Mütter.
In Frankreich läuft das so in mindestens 20 000 Familien. Ungefähr 200 000 Personen leben in Frankreich in polygamen Familien. Ich habe mir erlaubt, die Zahlen von 2008 ein wenig anzupassen an die Entwicklung. Wahrscheinlich sind sie inzwischen noch höher.

Frankreich. Einbürgerung und legale Polygamie. Mode d´emploi

Sehr geehrter Herr Bundespräsident, Sie persönlich können noch sehr viel mehr tun, daß der Islam nicht nur zu Deutschland gehört, sondern in Deutschland zur gesetzgebenden Religion wird. Ihr Auftritt mit Ihren zwei Frauen wäre ein qualitativer Durchbruch.

Es reicht nicht, daß Sie immer nur die Zweitfrau mitnehmen zu Ihren Einsätzen für Deutschland. Das ist unislamisch; denn der Islam lehrt, daß die Frauen gerecht und gleich zu behandeln sind.

Es reicht nicht, daß die Katholische junge Gemeinde sich dafür einsetzt, daß Polygamie nicht mehr tabuisiert wird. Sie sollten Ihre ganze Autorität einsetzen und zeigen, daß Sie ebenfalls für Polygamie sind. Lassen Sie die Jugend nicht allein in ihrem Kampf, lassen Sie sie nicht durch reaktionäre Pfarrer skandalisieren.
Danke für alles, was Sie für Deutschland leisten! Hochachtungsvoll

Ihre total begeisterte Dr. Gudrun Eussner


Diesem Brief kann ich mich nur anschliessen, Wulff war erst ein Anfang, Gauck bereitet den Weg zur Vollendung der Scharia in Deutschland. Da besteht Hoffnung auch für alle Pädosexuellen, dass ihre Bedürfnisse via Legalisierung der Vielweiberei und der Kinderehe endlich ganz legal befriedigt werden können. Als Steigerung von Wulff und Gauck könnte ich mir auch den Pädathie als nächsten Träger dieses Amtes vorstellen, nach seiner vollständigen Rehabilitierung und Wiedereinsetzung in alle Funktionen im Kampf gegen die  NSU und Ernennung zum Leiter des Untersuchungsausschusses gegen die NSA.  Mit Recht beanstanden alle bisherigen Kriminellen in den Reihen der Grünen die mögliche Erfassung ihrer Daten, was ihnen den straffreien Zugang  zu den internationalen Kinderpornonetzwerken  vermasseln könnte. Das muss ändern und wird erst mit der vollen  Legalisierung der Pädogamie endlich behoben werden.  Der Weg vom gewöhnlichen Austausch der Ehefrau zwecks Karrieresprung à la Wulff  über die  offiziell institutionalisierte Zweitfrau à la Gauck bis zum Homo-Ehepartner, demnächst auch im Knabenalter  genehm, à la  Edathie  ist bereitet.  Mit der Legalisierung der Knabenehe liesse sich eine gelungenen Verbindung von linksgrünem Fortschritt (multisexuelle Gemeinschaften) mit dem islamischem Recht der Kinderehe realisieren. Welche der christlichen Kirchen die meisten poly– und pädogamen Gemeinschaften segnet, ist noch nicht entschieden, aber wir dürfen hoffen.  Die Kirchentüren stehen allen präzivilisatorischen Primaten offen,  wie die Pufftüren.

Regine van Cleev





Ein ungeschickt formuliertes SMS an ihren sri-lankischen Schüler wirft eine Lehrerin in den Strudel von Rassismus-Vorwürfen und Mobbing im Lehrerzimmer. Sie verliert ihren Job und die Lust am Leben. Nun beschäftigt sich die Politik mit dem Fall. von Leif Simonsen 

  • Dieses SMS sollte Anita Biederts Leben ruinieren. Seit dem 1. Juni 2012 hat die Muttenzer Seklehrerin ihre Stelle verloren, ihren Mut und auch fast ihr Leben, als sie dem Ganzen ein Ende bereiten wollte – mit einem Sprung vor einen Zug. Sie sprang schliesslich nicht, und jetzt sitzt sie in den Redaktionsräumlichkeiten der bz – mit dem Papierstapel, der ihr Drama dokumentiert. Die 61-jährige Muttenzerin weint, aber sie lebt. Und sie sagt: «Ich will Klarheit. Ich bin keine Rassistin, als die ich hingestellt worden bin.» 
  • «Vergiss den CH-Pass bei deinen Deutschkenntnissen.» Das war der verhängnisvolle Inhalt der Kurznachricht, welche die Mathematik-Lehrerin an diesem 1. Juni vor zwei Jahren an ihren sri-lankischen Schüler schickte. «Vielleicht etwas ungeschickt», sagt Biedert heute, gewiss. Der Schüler aber, den sie ansonsten sehr mochte, hatte sie ungeheuerlich provoziert. 
  • Er hatte die Schule geschwänzt und einem Mitschüler geschrieben: «Schuel schisst mi a, ich chum nid.» Seiner Lehrerin hatte er vorgelogen, er wolle sich in Liestal den Schweizer Pass ausstellen lassen. Da platzte Biedert der Kragen: «In diesem Alter stellen doch die Sekschüler die Weichen für das Arbeitsleben. Wer unzuverlässig ist, hat keine Chance», sagt sie. 
  • Aufsatz über die Lehrerkollegin 
  • Ein paar heisse Sommertage zogen nach dem Vorfall ins Land, die Wogen schienen geglättet. Per Handschlag hatte Biedert im Beisein des Schulhausleiters die Sache mit dem damals 16-jährigen Schüler besiegelt. Und trotzdem spürte sie im Lehrerzimmer: Irgendwas hatte sich verändert.
  • Die Lehrerkollegen hatten die Episode aufgeschnappt. Sie argwöhnten ohnehin: Schliesslich politisiert Biedert in der SVP und sitzt in Muttenz in der Gemeindekommission. Im linkslastigen Lehrerkollegium hat man da Exotenstatus. Es begann, wie Biedert sagt, eine Hexenjagd. Eine Lehrerkollegin liess ihre Schüler einen Aufsatz schreiben mit dem Titel: «Frau Biedert und die Ausländer.» 
  • Die damalige Margelacker-Schulleitung lud Biedert zu einem Gespräch ein und warf ihr Rassismus vor. Die Lehrerkollegin schwärzte Biedert an: Sie könne nicht mehr unterrichten, solange die rassistische Kollegin hier sei. Im Muttenzer Margelacker-Schulhaus will zu diesen Vorwürfen heute niemand Stellung nehmen. Der Schulratspräsident Beat Eglin verweist auf das laufende Verfahren. 
  • Dokument nachträglich bearbeitet 
  • Der Schulleiter informiert am 18. Juni 2012 das kantonale Personalamt, welches das SMS als Grund für eine Entlassung taxiert. Drei Tage später folgt wieder ein Gespräch zwischen Anita Biedert und der Schulleitung. Dieses Mal soll Biedert ein Dokument unterzeichnen – nur dann müsste sie keine «weiteren Konsequenzen» fürchten. Auch dieses Papier liegt der bz  vor.
  • mehr:   ]http://www.bzbasel.ch/basel/baselbiet/sms-an-tamilischen-schueler-ruiniert-das-leben-einer-baselbieter-lehrerin-128043322[/embed]


Die Mobbermentalität der linken Hetzjagdszene nimmt Formen an, wie man sie  aus den Schilderungen des Schwarzbuchs Kommunismus kennt.  Die Schweizer Linke hat den stalinistischen Standard bewahrt. Was diese verkommene Mobbermeute sich herausnimmt, geht auf keine Kuhhaut mehr. Wir kennen die Denunziantenbanden  und ihre rufmörderischen Linksanwälte, die  auf die  Islamkritiker losgehen, aber einen Fall wie diesen  kannten wir noch nicht, in dem eine linke Mobberin auf eine Kollegin losgeht und ihre Schüler auf sie hetzt mit dem besagten Aufsatzthema. Er erinnert allerdings an einen viel  früheren Fall aus dem linken Schulmilieu, über den vor Jahren der Beobachter berichtete, und zwar im Sinne der linken Lehrerschaft.  Damals handelte es sich damals um ein Mädchen, das von albanischen Jungmachos terrorisiert wurde und sich bei seiner Lehrerin beklagte. Die linke Pädagogin, statt das Mädchen zu schützen, fiel ihm in den Rücken und stellte es vor der ganzen Klasse an den „Rassismus“-Pranger, eine widerwärtige Umschleimung der Gewalt, mit der sich die täterschützende Linke als willige Helferin und H…  des links umbuhlten Machokulturkreises erwies. Wir werden sehen, wie weit die  Schweizer Justiz vor dem totalitären linken Mob zu Boden geht.  In Baselland treibt seit langem eine linke Kriminellenschützerin  als Staatsanwältin ihr Unwesen.





Die Entfesselung der Islambestie ISIS

Syria’s ISIS Crucifying Opponents,  Justifying Horror with Quran Passages

by Jonathan Spyer and Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi
PJ Media
May 27, 2014


Evidence is mounting that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is systematically committing atrocities in eastern and northern Syria, its areas of control.

While individual incidents of brutality have been well-documented, the near-impossibility of on-the-spot reporting in the area controlled by the organization has made it difficult to build a general description of the situation there. However, as more and more witnesses come forward, the picture is gradually becoming clearer.

Public executions are a regular weekly occurrence in Raqqa city, the provincial capital controlled by ISIS. In a number of verified cases, the bodies of executed people have been „crucified“ — placed on crosses in public areas after execution by other means, supposedly to act as a deterrent to others. (Note: at least one crucifixion of a living victim by an Islamist group has occurred recently, in Yemen.Video here.)

ISIS invoked Qur’an 5:33 in a case of two people being crucified in Raqqa for supposedly carrying out an IED attack against ISIS. The Quran passage stipulates that, among a number of punishments, those who „wage war on God and His Messenger“ may be crucified.

An earlier case in Raqqa in late March was also justified as the appropriate penalty for alleged stealing and murder, though it was not officially advertised by ISIS. The case seems to fall under the same framework of Quran 5:33, which also mentions „striving to cause corruption on Earth“ as an offense that can warrant crucifixion.

Crucifixions are by no means the exclusive realm of ISIS: they can also be carried out in Saudi Arabiafor crimes such as terrorism and highway robbery. The issue is that ISIS is defining itself as the one and only true Islamic state; in their view, waging war on ISIS thus constitutes waging war on „God and His Messenger.“

For ISIS, Raqqa — often described in ISIS circles as the „capital“ of ISIS — is very much the prototype model Islamic city, where aspects of Islamic law are first introduced and are then spread to other areas of ISIS-held territory. (Their territory currently encompasses all major urban areas in Raqqa province, eastern Aleppo province, and most of southern and central Hasakah province). The crucifixions are a case-in-point: once implemented officially in Raqqa, the practice then spread to other ISIS strongholds, most notably the Aleppo provincial towns of Maskanah and Manbij.

As in Raqqa, those subjected to crucifixion are suspected of having had ties to rival underground rebel groups trying to undermine ISIS with clandestine attacks. In Maskanah, the crucifixion was presented as the „punishment for apostasy“ for one of three alleged „shabiha“ members.

By invoking apostasy, ISIS likely is referencing this hadith, where it is stipulated that one of the cases in which a Muslim’s blood may be lawfully shed is for fighting against God and His Messenger (similar to Qur’an 5:33). In this case, the punishment is crucifixion or exile. The crime in question has been interpreted to be apostasy.

Also in Raqqa, Christians have had the first dhimmi pact from ISIS imposed upon them.

Christians there are required to pay a special tax (jizya) to the ISIS authorities. Christians may not publicly wear crosses, pray in the presence of Muslims, or repair or renovate places of worship. As with the crucifixions, ISIS invoked Qur’anic justification for imposing the dhimmi pact: Qur’an 9:29. (This invocation was largely overlooked in prior media coverage of this development.) ISIS later announced that arrangements were underway for the imposition of the dhimmi pact on Christians in Hasakah province living under ISIS dominion.

Last month, a group of activists in Raqqa city formed a group called „Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently“ with hopes of spreading information about the city’s current condition. The 20 members of the group were then sentenced to death by ISIS for „non-belief in Islam.“ A large cash prize has been offered by ISIS for information leading to their capture.

The horror gets worse: the most shocking evidence of brutality comes from witnesses to the jails maintained by ISIS.

Perwer Janfrosh, a 25-year-old Syrian Kurd from the city of Kobani, was arrested by ISIS while attempting to cross the Syrian-Turkish border. He was held for five days in an ISIS jail in the town of Jarabulus in northern Syria.

Janfrosh claims to have witnessed the torture and killing of a Kurdish man for the „crime“ of raising the flag of the Kurdish YPG militia in the town, and also the torture of Arab residents of the town who had been arrested for drinking alcohol.

Said al-Adlubi, a Syrian Arab refugee and former fighter with the Free Syrian Army, told the „Rescue Christians“ organization that he witnessed the slaughter of kidnapped Christians in ISIS captivity who were killed because ransom had not been paid.

Adlubi also said he had seen a gruesome mortuary maintained by ISIS, where the corpses of slaughtered prisoners were hung on hooks. Rescue Christians spoke with a second witness — Kamil Toume, a Syrian Christian and former prisoner of ISIS — who confirmed Adlubi’s account of the „slaughterhouses.“

Janfrosh and Adlubi both spoke of being described as „apostates“ by their ISIS captors. Apostasy is a crime punishable by death according to Sharia law.

The brutality of ISIS ultimately is no surprise: the group already considers itself a state (dawla), not a mere group or organization (jamaat, or tanzim). Those descriptors are considered insulting by ISIS. ISIS intends to establish itself for the long-run, and is not open to power-sharing, compromise, or accountability at the hands of arbitration by a third-party. Totalitarianism is thus the natural consequence, as is the wider infighting between ISIS and other rebel groups across many parts of Syria. Most notably, intense fighting has occurred with Syria’s official al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, as ISIS seeks to connect Anbar province in western Iraq with its territorial holdings in Syria.

Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and a fellow at the Middle East Forum. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum.